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I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Slobogin’s new book, Proving the Unprovable,1 is the 
most provocative evidence text that I have read in years.  In the book, 
he argues in favor of a more relaxed standard for admitting psy-
chologists’ and psychiatrists’ testimony about a person’s prior mental 
state.2  He contends that a person’s earlier mental state is essentially 
unprovable3 and that it is impossible to gauge the validity of such tes-
timony4 in the sense of its substantive accuracy.5  He concludes that 
the nature of such testimony ordinarily precludes the application of 
the normal expert testimony standards prescribed by Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.6 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.7
Instead, he proposes generally accepted content validity as the 
standard for admissibility.8  The proposal contemplates the creation 
of a database of cases in which psychiatrists’ or psychologists’ testi-
mony about prior mental state was used.9  The database would in-
clude information such as the reports, testimony, and verdict in the 
case to identify the factors that the legal decisionmaker considered 
relevant.10  The database would be used to refine structured interview 
 ∗ Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. 
 1 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS (2007). 
 2 See id. at 18. 
 3 Id. at 57 (describing the mental state as “ultimately unknowable”); id. at 140 
(describing testimony as “inscrutab[le],” the reliability of which “we cannot know”). 
 4 Id. at 41. 
 5 Id. at 16. 
 6 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 7 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 8 SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 16. 
 9 Id. at 63–65. 
 10 Id. at 65. 
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instruments.11  Psychiatrists and psychologists could use the instru-
ments to ensure that their report addressed the factors that the law 
considers material in the specific context, such as an insanity defense 
in a criminal trial.12
In Proving the Unprovable, Professor Slobogin presents a balanced 
analysis.  In critical passages, he adds important qualifications.  For 
instance, he states that “scientifically verified evidence” is “usually” 
unavailable as a basis for expert testimony about past mental states.13  
He writes that “[i]n those few instances when scientifically reliable in-
formation material to [the] issue [of past mental state] is available, 
the expert should rely on it.”14  In addition, at several points he notes 
the utility of malingering detection techniques.15
My fear, though, is that some may not read Proving the Unprovable 
closely enough and may lose sight of those qualifications.  The book 
is argued so forcefully that readers may instead focus on Professor 
Slobogin’s broad language suggesting that the very nature of the 
topic precludes policing the substantive accuracy of the relevant ex-
pert testimony.  Professor Slobogin professes that his deep concerns 
are epistemological.16  In his view, “[s]peculative clinical testimony 
. . . is probably the best we can do for the foreseeable future.”17
Our difference of opinion may simply be one of emphasis and 
degree.  However, I feel obliged to say that I have grave doubts about 
the wisdom of a general call to abandon the search for substantive 
accuracy in psychological and psychiatry testimony.  The purpose of 
this short Article is to explain the source of my doubts.  Part II of this 
Article is a descriptive survey of the state of the art of determining 
malingering by subjects of psychological and psychiatric interviews.  
Part III is a critical evaluation of the state of that art.  Part IV asks 
what light the state of the art of malingering detection sheds on the 
question of whether it is necessary to abandon any attempt to ensure 
the substantive accuracy of testimony by psychologists and psychia-
trists about a person’s prior mental state. 
 11 Id. at 66. 
 12 Id. at 16, 66. 
 13 Id. at 57. 
 14 SLOGOBIN, supra note 1, at 59. 
 15 See, e.g., id. at 65, 140; see also Dorothy Clay Sims, The Myth of Malingering: Is It 
the Truth or a Lie?, PLAINTIFF, Dec. 2007, at 1. 
 16 SLOGOBIN, supra note 1, at 59. 
 17 Id. at 40. 
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II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE STATE OF THE ART  
OF DETECTING MALINGERING BY MENTAL PATIENTS 
Today there are numerous methods for detecting malingering 
by subjects. 
A. The Adaptation of “Lie Detector” Techniques 
The forensic and law enforcement communities use a number of 
techniques, including polygraphy, in order to determine whether a 
person is lying.  Malingering is a form of lying.  Therefore, it should 
come as no surprise that several of these techniques have been 
adapted to determine whether a subject is malingering. 
By way of example, researchers have endeavored to use hypnosis 
to determine whether a person is malingering.18  Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the subject claims amnesia as to events involved in a civil or 
criminal case.19  However, the use of hypnosis for this purpose is con-
troversial.20  To begin with, it can be difficult to determine the au-
thenticity of the apparent trance:21 Is the person actually in a trance, 
or is the subject faking?22  Further, even assuming that the subject is 
in a trance, some memories purportedly recovered during hypnotic 
induction prove to be false pseudo-memories.23  Unfortunately, there 
is no definitive test to differentiate between pseudo-memories and 
genuine memories of events based on historical truth.24
Likewise, researchers have employed drug-assisted interviews to 
detect malingering.25  Psychoactive substances26 such as barbiturates,27 
sodium amytal (amobarbital),28 amphetamines,29 droperidol,30 and 
ketamine31 have all been used.  These drugs can induce a state of re-
 18 Robert D. Miller & Lawrence J. Stava, Hypnosis and Dissimulation, in CLINICAL 
ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION 282 (Richard Rogers ed., 2d ed. 1997) 
[hereinafter MALINGERING AND DECEPTION]. 
 19 Id. at 294–95. 
 20 Id. at 282. 
 21 Id. at 285, 299. 
 22 Id. at 286, 293, 299–300. 
 23 Id. at 289. 
 24 Miller & Stava, supra note 18, at 289. 
 25 Richard Rogers & Robert M. Wettstein, Drug-Assisted Interviews to Detect Malinger-
ing and Deception, in MALINGERING AND DECEPTION, supra note 18, at 239. 
 26 Id. at 240. 
 27 Id. at 239. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 249. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Rogers & Wettstein, supra note 25, at 249. 
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laxation32 and have a disinhibitory effect on the subject’s ability to 
manipulate the content of a self-report.33  However, there has been 
relatively little research into these techniques.34  Worse still, the avail-
able studies indicate that some patients can deceive during such in-
terviews,35 and there are no clearly established criteria for identifying 
such deceptions.36
B. Unstructured Interviews 
For years clinicians have conducted unstructured interviews with 
patients, and over the years they have identified certain indicators of 
deception.37  The indicators include, inter alia, the following clues38: 
• The patient reports preposterous39 or absurd40 symptoms. 
• The patient quickly accepts the interviewer’s suggestion 
of symptoms.41 
• The patient reports rare symptoms42 that occur infre-
quently in the normative clinical group43—for example, 
in less than five percent of the normative group.44 
• The patient reports rare combinations of symptoms.45 
• The patient reports contradictory symptoms.46 
• Even if the symptoms are not outright contradictory, they 
are inconsistent.47 
 32 Id. at 241. 
 33 Id. at 242. 
 34 Id. at 241, 245, 250. 
 35 Id. at 247. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Richard Rogers, Structured Interviews and Dissimulation, in MALINGERING AND 
DECEPTION, supra note 18, at 301, 303–04. 
 38 Dewey G. Cornell & Gary L. Hawk, Clinical Presentation of Malingerers Diagnosed 
by Experienced Forensic Psychologists, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 375, 376 (1989). 
 39 Rogers, supra note 37, at 304.  “In one case, neon-green blood spurted from a 
gigantic Satan who was successfully vanquished in the patient’s living room with a 
handy chain saw; a 60-foot Christ waited outside his small cottage to congratulate 
him on his accomplishment.”  Id. 
 40 Shayna Gothard et al., Detection of Malingering in Competency to Stand Trial 
Evaluations, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 493, 503 (1995). 
 41 Cornell & Hawk, supra note 38, at 378. 
 42 Rogers, supra note 37, at 303. 
 43 Roger L. Greene, Assessment of Malingering and Defensiveness by Multiscale Person-
ality Inventories, in MALINGERING AND DECEPTION, supra note 18, at 169, 177–79. 
 44 Rogers, supra note 37, at 310. 
 45 Id. at 310–11. 
 46 Id. at 310 (discussing “psychomotor agitation and psychomotor retardation”); 
see Douglass Mossman, Daubert, Cognitive Malingering, and Test Accuracy, 27 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 229, 230 (2003). 
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• “[T]he examinee’s demeanor changes as he enters or 
leaves the examination area.”48 
• The subject overplays49 by reporting grossly exaggerated 
or overblown50 symptoms. 
• The subject engages in global faking51 and indiscrimi-
nately endorses a large number of symptoms.52  If, for in-
stance, the patient endorses more than two thirds of the 
possible symptoms for a mental disorder, the sheer num-
ber of symptoms gives rise to a strong suspicion that the 
patient is malingering.53 
• Although the patient reports the blatant, obvious symp-
toms for the mental state, the patient does not describe 
any of the subtle symptoms that normally accompany the 
mental state.54 
• The subject follows a curious pattern in endorsing symp-
toms suggested by the interviewer.  Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the subject alternates true and false answers to a 
series of twenty questions.55 
• The subject reports the sudden,56 abrupt57 onset of a 
mental illness that ordinarily gradually emerges.58 
 47 Greene, supra note 43, at 170, 174. 
 48 Steve Rubenzer, Malingering of Psychiatric Disorders and Cognitive Impairments in 
Criminal Court Settings, THE PROSECUTOR, Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 3. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Eric Y. Drogin, “When I said That I Was Lying, I Might Have Been Lying”: The Phe-
nomenon of Psychological Malingering, 25 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 711 
(2001). 
 51 Greene, supra note 43, at 184. 
 52 Rogers, supra note 37, at 308. 
 53 Id. at 303. 
 54 Id.; Greene, supra note 43, at 191; Cornell & Hawk, supra note 38, at 382 
(“blunted or inappropriate affect, and formal thought disorder (e.g., loose or tan-
gential speech patterns) . . . is consistent with Resnick’s view . . . that malingerers 
mimic the content, but not the form, of psychotic thinking”); JOHN PARRY & ERIC Y. 
DROGIN, MENTAL DISABILITY: LAW, EVIDENCE, AND TESTIMONY 245 (2007) (“even a 
practiced malingerer ‘may omit some of the more subtle symptoms of mental illness’ 
. . . [such as] blunted or inappropriate affect, and formal thought disorders such as 
loose or tangential speech patterns”). 
 55 Greene, supra note 43, at 174. 
 56 Richard Rogers et al., The SIRS as a Measure of Malingering: A Validation Study 
with a Correctional Sample, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 85, 92 (1990). 
 57 Rogers, supra note 37, at 308. 
 58 Miller & Stava, supra note 18, at 286. 
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• The subject describes unrealistically severe symptoms.59  
Suppose, for instance, that the subject claims that he or 
she has suffered from virtually unbearable symptoms60 
“all my life.”61  The interviewer should be skeptical if the 
subject reports the majority62 of his or her symptoms or, 
in the view of some researchers, four symptoms63 at an in-
tense level. 
C. Multiscale Personality Inventories 
Some standard psychological tests have also been used to assist 
in the detection of malingering.64  For example, there are indications 
that malingerers claiming a mental illness perform differently on tests 
such as personality inventories65 than persons actually suffering from 
the illness.66
There are numerous standard tests that have at least occasionally 
been employed in the detection of deception: the Basic Personality 
Inventory (BPI);67 the Bender-Gestalt;68 the California Psychological 
Inventory-Revised (CPI-R);69 the Inventory of Problems (IOP);70 and 
the relatively new Personal Assessment Inventory (PAI).71 In general, 
in searching for evidence of a malingering performance on the test, 
the researcher looks for tests in which the subject did not achieve the 
expected proportion of correct responses.72  If the subject’s perform-
ance is atypically bad73 even on simple tasks74—for example, two stan-
 59 Rogers, supra note 37, at 313. 
 60 Rogers et al., supra note 56, at 92. 
 61 Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 2. 
 62 Richard Rogers, Current Status of Clinical Methods, in MALINGERING AND 
DECEPTION, supra note 18, at 373–74. 
 63 Rogers, supra note 37, at 313. 
 64 Richard Rogers et al., Explanatory Models of Malingering: A Prototypical Analysis, 
18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 543, 543 (1994). 
 65 Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 504; James R.P. Ogloff, The Admissibility of Ex-
pert Testimony Regarding Malingering and Deception, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 27, 34–35 (1990). 
 66 Glenn P. Smith, Assessment of Malingering with Self-Report Instruments, in 
MALINGERING AND DECEPTION, supra note 18, at 351. 
 67 R. Michael Bagby et al., Detection of Dissimulation with the New Generation of Objec-
tive Personality Measures, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 93, 94–95 (1990). 
 68 Loren Pankratz & Laurence M. Binder, Malingering on Intellectual and Neuropsy-
chological Measures, in MALINGERING AND DECEPTION, supra note 18, at 223, 231. 
 69 Greene, supra note 43, at 170. 
 70 Smith, supra note 66, at 366. 
 71 Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 3. 
 72 Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 231–32. 
 73 Id. at 231. 
 74 Id. at 232. 
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dard deviations below the performance for a normative clinical group 
of persons suffering from the illness75—there is a strong possibility of 
malingering.  When the subject’s performance is improbably 
poor76—statistically significantly lower than chance77—it is a common-
sense inference that the subject recognized the correct answer but 
deliberately chose an incorrect answer.78
There has been some malingering research with respect to the 
Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI).79  For example, there is 
a Validity Index for the test.80  If the subject endorses an extremely 
rare symptom manifested by less than 0.01% of the normative clinical 
population, there is a justifiable suspicion of malingering.81  Further, 
there is a Debasement scale (“Scale Z”) on MCMI-III,82 and some re-
searchers have successfully used the scale to identify students who 
were instructed to malinger on the test.83
However, by a wide margin, the inventory used most frequently 
is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2).84  
The MMPI-2 has the advantage that there is available comparative 
data for a normative group of 3475 patients.85  Researchers have capi-
talized on this data to develop several scales and indices for detecting 
malingering: 
• The Lie Scale (L):86 The detection strategy underlying 
this scale is to identify persons who choose “items with 
extremely desirable but very rare human qualities.  If a 
person endorsed a large number of these items, the 
probability is very high that the responses would be dis-
honest.”87 
• The F Scales:88 These include the Fake Bad Scale (FBS).89  
Here the underlying detection strategy is based on the 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 227. 
 77 Id. at 228–29, 230. 
 78 Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 230. 
 79 Greene, supra note 43, at 169. 
 80 Id. at 182. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 195. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 169. 
 85 Greene, supra note 43, at 169; see Rogers, supra note 62, at 383. 
 86 Greene, supra note 43, at 170. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 177. 
 89 Id. 
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infrequency or rarity of certain symptoms.90  For in-
stance, the subject might endorse several symptoms, each 
reported by less than 10% of the normative sample.91  
Traditionally, malingering researchers have placed 
greatest reliance on the F scales on the MMPI-2.92 
• The Gough Dissimulation Index (Ds):93 In some studies, 
this index has been used successfully to identify 97% of 
the authentic profiles and 75% of the malingerers.94  
However, there are multiple versions of the Ds,95 and 
there have been few studies of some of these versions.96 
D. Screening Specialized Instruments 
The techniques discussed above have applications other than the 
detection of malingering.  We turn now to more specialized tech-
niques, developed primarily or exclusively for detecting the subject’s 
attempt to feign symptoms.  Today there are so many such specialized 
instruments that there are both full-fledged tests and screening in-
struments. 
There are numerous screening techniques.  The latest genera-
tion of screens includes: the Tehachapi Malingering Scale (TMS),97 a 
brief 20-item test;98 the Malingering Detection Scale (MDS), a 29-item 
instrument;99 the Malingering Probability Scale (MPS), a 140-item in-
strument in true-false format;100 the Structured Inventory of Malin-
gered Symptomatology (SIMS), which consists of 75 items organized 
into five scales;101 and the Sentence Completion Test (SCT), which 
includes 136 items in 12 categories.102  Although most of these in-
struments are relatively short,103 in some studies they have been re-
markably effective.  For example, in one test the MPS achieved 94% 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Greene, supra note 43, at 187. 
 93 Id. at 190, 194. 
 94 Id. at 190. 
 95 Id. at 194. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Smith, supra note 66, at 360. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 361–62. 
 100 Id. at 362–64. 
 101 Id. at 364–66. 
 102 Id. at 367–68. 
 103 See Smith, supra note 66, at 352. 
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sensitivity and 88% specificity.104  In another test, the total score for 
SIMS enabled researchers to identify 95.6% of the simulators.105
Nevertheless, the most popular screen is the M Test.106  It has 
been subjected to more rigorous testing than any other screen.107  
The M Test is specifically designed to detect the malingering of 
schizophrenia.108  The test consists of 33 true-false items with three 
scales: confusion (C), malingering (M), and schizophrenia (S).109  
The S scale items relate to genuine symptoms of schizophrenia.  In 
contrast, the M scale includes 15 items related to bogus symptoms 
such as extremely severe symptoms and atypical delusions and hallu-
cinations.110  The essential premise of the test is that a malingerer is 
likely to be unable to distinguish the genuine and bogus symptoms.111  
The attempts to validate the M Test have yielded mixed results.  In 
some studies, the researchers accurately classified the vast majority of 
subjects, for instance, 87.3%112 or 95.2.113  However, in other tests the 
accuracy rate of the classifications has been much lower, dipping to 
40%114 or 30.8%.115
The consensus is that these screens should be used only as the 
initial level of assessment.116  Rather than serving as the sole basis for 
a finding of malingering, a screen test ought to merely trigger a more 
thorough assessment.117  Many of the screens have limited probative 
value.  In some cases, the validating tests consisted of small samples.118  
In other cases, they have not been cross-validated with known malin-
gerers as well as test subjects instructed to malinger.119  As a result, a 
screening test result indicating malingering must be confirmed by a 
more thorough specialized instrument. 
 104 Id. at 363. 
 105 Id. at 365. 
 106 Id. at 352. 
 107 Id. at 357. 
 108 Id. at 352. 
 109 Smith, supra note 66, at 352. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 353. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Smith, supra note 66, at 353. 
 116 Margaret P. Norris & Mary C. May, Screening for Malingering in a Correctional Set-
ting, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 315, 322 (1998). 
 117 Smith, supra note 66, at 368. 
 118 See id. at 359. 
 119 Id. at 355. 
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E. Full-Fledged Specialized Malingering Instruments 
Just as there are several malingering screens, a large number of 
full-fledged malingering instruments exists.  The number is both 
large and growing.120  The full-fledged instruments include: the Diag-
nostic Interview Schedule (DIS);121 the Dot Counting Test;122  the Rey 
Fifteen-Item Test (FIT);123 the Georgia Court Competence Test-
Mississippi State Hospital (GCCT-MSH);124 the Structured Clinical In-
terview (SCID);125 the Portland Digit Recognition Test (PDRT);126  
and the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM).127  In scoring these 
tests, the analyst looks for performance significantly worse than 
chance.128  If the subject’s score falls below the chance level by two 
standard deviations,129 “it is likely that the person has some knowl-
edge of the correct responses and is deliberately answering incor-
rectly.”130
Although the above instruments have received some attention in 
the literature, two instruments have been especially popular.  One 
such instrument is the Schedule of Affective Disorders and Schizo-
phrenia (SADS).131  While the test is “not an impenetrable shield 
against fabrication,”132 the indications are that the subject must pos-
sess a sophisticated understanding of the mental disorder in question 
in order to malinger on the test without detection.133  There are three 
sources for normative SADS data: forensic patients, patients with 
schizophrenia, and jail referrals.134  The instrument uses several de-
tection strategies, including whether the reported symptom or com-
bination of symptoms is rare, whether the reported symptoms are 
contradictory, whether the subject has indiscriminately endorsed a 
 120 Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 2. 
 121 Rogers, supra note 37, at 319–20. 
 122 Drogin, supra note 50, at 713; Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 4. 
 123 Mossman, supra note 46, at 230. 
 124 Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 493, 503. 
 125 Rogers, supra note 37, at 319. 
 126 Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 228–29; Drogin, supra note 50, at 713. 
 127 Drogin, supra note 50, at 713 (the test “has achieved positive research valida-
tion”); Mossman, supra note 46, at 230 (this is an “often-used test[] of malingered 
cognitive deficits”). 
 128 Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 228–29. 
 129 Grant L. Iverson et al., Evaluation of an Objective Assessment Technique for the Detec-
tion of Malingered Memory Deficits, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 667, 668 (1991). 
 130 Id. at 674. 
 131 Rogers, supra note 37, at 307. 
 132 Id. at 308. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 309–10. 
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large number of symptoms, and whether the subject has rated an im-
plausibly large number of symptoms as severe or extreme in inten-
sity.135  If the subject describes several symptoms, each of which is en-
countered in less than five percent of the forensic sample, there is 
good reason to believe that the subject is malingering.136  Likewise, 
based on the comparative data for schizophrenic and jail referral 
samples, malingering is a likely hypothesis if the subject endorses 
more than four symptoms at severe or extreme severity.137
Probably the most specialized instrument is the Structured In-
terview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS).  SIRS was first developed in 
1985.138  The current version of SIRS includes 172 items.139  The test 
usually requires thirty to forty-five minutes to administer140 and fifteen 
minutes to score.141 The items fall into three categories:  detailed in-
quiries about specific symptoms, repeated inquiries designed to test 
response consistency, and general inquiries about psychological prob-
lems.142  The test is organized into eight primary scales and five sup-
plementary ones.143  In developing SIRS, experienced experts identi-
fied eight primary strategies and formulated a scale to implement 
each strategy.144  The strategies are as follows: 
• RS: the subject has endorsed a rare symptom; 
• SC: the subject has endorsed an uncommon combination 
of symptoms; 
• IA: the subject has endorsed an implausible or fantastic 
symptom; 
• BL: the subject has endorsed a disproportionate number 
of blatant symptoms; 
• SU: many of the “symptoms” reported are ordinarily 
viewed as everyday problems; 
• SEL: the sheer number of symptoms reported is improb-
able; 
 135 Id. at 310–13. 
 136 Id. at 310–11. 
 137 Rogers, supra note 37, at 313. 
 138 Id. at 321. 
 139 Id.; see PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 54, at 244–45 (‘[o]ne of the most promising 
tools”). 
 140 Norris & May, supra note 116, at 316. 
 141 Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 4. 
 142 Rogers, supra note 37, at 321. 
 143 Id.; Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 496 (“Eight of these scales are termed pri-
mary scales, as they have consistently been demonstrated to be the most accurate in 
sorting fakers from honest respondents.”). 
 144 Rogers, supra note 37, at 321. 
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• SEV: the subject reports a large number of symptoms at 
an extreme or unbearable level of intensity; and 
• RO: the subject’s self-reporting of observable behavior is 
at odds with third parties’ observations.145 
A subject may be classified as a malingerer on one of three dif-
ferent bases: one exceptionally high scale, three or more scales in the 
probable feigning range, or an enhanced total score.146  There has 
been little research involving SIRS testing of adolescents or mentally 
retarded individuals.147  But with those notable exceptions, there has 
been extensive validation research with SIRS, and those studies “have 
demonstrated consistently its usefulness in classifying feigners and 
honest responders.”148  In many of the studies, the accurate hit rate 
was in the high eighty to ninety percentiles.149
III. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE  
STATE OF THE ART OF DETECTING MALINGERING 
Part II described the status quo of malingering testing.  In light 
of that data, where does malingering testing stand? 
A. The Limitations of the Current State of the Art 
Although there has been substantial progress in malingering tes-
ting during the past few decades,150 there are still some obvious limi-
tations to the methodology. 
To begin with, malingering tests are most appropriately used in 
the forensic context.151  Most clinicians do not utilize such tests.152  
 145 Id. at 322. 
 146 Id. at 325. 
 147 See id. at 324. 
 148 Id.; Drogin, supra note 50, at 713 (“Where psychopathology is concerned, 
the . . . SIRS . . . has fared well in follow-up studies.”). 
 149 Rogers, supra note 37, at 322–23, 324; Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 500, 502  
(96.7%, 97.8%); Rogers et al., supra note 56, at 89. 
 150 See Rogers, supra note 62, at 373.  There has also been substantial progress in 
the techniques for forecasting dangerousness.  Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness 
and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275 (2006). 
  [P]rediction methodology has significantly improved.  Two decades ago, 
actuarial methods for predicting violent behavior were in their infancy 
and the dominant method of evaluating dangerousness was essentially 
seat-of-the-pants, “clinical” speculation.  Today the development of sev-
eral sophisticated, empirically validated risk assessment instruments has 
made prediction much more of a science. 
Id. at 277. 
 151 Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 5–6. 
 152 Rogers, supra note 37, at 302. 
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Likewise, most treating neurophysiologists do not administer the tests 
to their patients.153  The widespread belief is that the administration 
of a malingering test is incompatible with developing the sort of trust-
ing relationship needed for effective treatment.154
Moreover, many of the tests are vulnerable to coaching.155  Many, 
if not most, malingerers156 may use relatively unsophisticated strate-
gies, based on simplistic notions about mental states.157 However, not 
all feigners are naive and unprepared.158  On some tests, if the malin-
gerer prepares by learning a good deal about the mental state to be 
faked, the malingerer has a much better chance of foiling the test.159  
For example, despite early claims to the contrary,160 it is clear that 
simulators often succeed in faking on projective measures such as the 
Rorschach test.161  Moreover, the available research indicates that it is 
easier to feign a cognitive deficit than a mental illness.162  However, 
coaching and advance preparation seem to have little effect on the 
ability of either the MMPI-2 or the SIRS to detect malingering.163
More fundamentally, there are concerns about the extent and 
quality of the validation of some of the tests described in Part II.  In 
unstructured interviews, there are no standard objective diagnostic 
criteria that the interviewer can rely on to detect malingering.164  In 
 153 Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 233. 
 154 Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 1. 
 155 Rogers, supra note 62, at 379. 
 156 In forensic practice, many malingerers tend to be relatively young and poorly 
educated.  See Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 498. 
 157 Id. at 504. 
 158 Rogers, supra note 62, at 379; see Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall, Detection 
of Malingered PTSD: An Overview of Clinical, Psychometric, and Physiological Assessment: 
Where Do We Stand?, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 717, 718 (2007) (the Internet increases the 
accessibility of information about mental diseases and how to feign them). 
 159 Greene, supra note 43, at 187. 
 160 David J. Schretlen, Dissimulation on the Rorschach and Other Projective Measures, in 
MALINGERING AND DECEPTION, supra note 18, at 208, 209 (it was asserted that “the 
Rorschach measures processes and traits that are largely unconscious and essentially 
beyond volitional control”). 
 161 Id. at 212–13, 215, 221; Rogers, supra note 62, at 374. 
 162 See Rogers, supra note 62, at 375 (“Unlike the fabrication of a mental disorder 
(e.g. a constellation of symptoms and associated features with a convincing onset and 
course), feigned cognitive deficits do not require the creation of anything.  Instead, 
malingerers simply can claim ‘not to know’ or appear to expend effort but provide 
an incorrect response.”). 
 163 Id. at 383. 
 164 Cornell & Hawk, supra note 38, at 383; see PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 54, at 
243 (“a question exists as to whether clinicians have ‘any extraordinary ability to de-
tect malingering’”; judges should weigh clinical evidence “cautiously. . . . [E]ven cli-
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the case of many techniques, there has been little or no cross-
validating research with known malingerers or persons instructed to 
malinger.165  “[S]imulation research . . . should be validated with 
known-groups comparison.”166  Persons suffering from factitious dis-
orders feign symptoms out of a psychological need to assume the sick 
role.167  In contrast, true malingerers feign symptoms due to some ex-
ternal incentive.168  Thus, a research subject in a malingering study 
should not only be instructed to feign, he or she should also be pro-
vided an external incentive.  For example, the subject is sometimes 
promised a financial reward to successfully fool the interviewer.169  In 
the real world, though, a malingerer such as a criminal might be 
much more strongly motivated to dupe the interviewer.170  That is why 
the validation of the detection technique with a sample of known ma-
lingerers is so critical. 
Finally, there is agreement that an interviewer should not rest a 
finding of malingering on the basis of the outcome of a single tech-
nique or instrument.171  Standing alone, no individual test outcome 
or result is probative enough to constitute sole proof of malinger-
ing.172  No matter how extreme the subject’s test on one test or in-
strument, the interviewer must confirm that test with an independent 
technique.173
nicians working in forensic settings, who are familiar with malingering, have a high 
‘misidentification rate.’”). 
 165 Rogers, supra note 62, at 373 (remarking on “a paucity of research cross-
validating”); see also Hall & Hall, supra note 158, at 722 (known simulators). 
 166 Smith, supra note 66, at 370; see Rogers, supra note 62, at 374. 
 167 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (DSM-IV-TR) 513 (4th ed. 2000). 
 168 Id. at 513, 516, 739. 
 169 Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 495; Rogers et al., supra note 56, at 87 (offering 
“an additional $5.00 for a convincing portrayal of mental illness”); Aldert Vrij et al., 
Will the Truth Come Out? The Effect of Deception, Age, Status, Coaching, and Social Skills on 
CBCA Scores, 26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 276 (2002) (offering a prize they can win). 
 170 Vrij et al., supra note 169, at 263. 
 171 Ogloff, supra note 65, at 35 (“there is really no method, when considered 
alone, that is entirely effective at identifying malingerers”); Rogers & Wettstein, supra 
note 25, at 248 (“alone”). 
 172 Rogers & Wettstein, supra note 25, at 248; Smith, supra note 66, at 368; Hall & 
Hall, supra 158, at 723 (noting that “there is no one way to identify the malingering 
of PTSD”). 
 173 Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 503. 
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B. The Utility of the Current Techniques for Detecting Malingering 
Despite the limitations mentioned above, tremendous progress 
has been made.174
Although the contemporary tests are still imperfect, they can be 
“very accurate.”175  There is impressive evidence that the use of the ex-
isting malingering detection techniques can enable interviewers to 
accurately classify malingerers from persons actually experiencing the 
claimed mental condition.176  In a study involving unstructured inter-
views by experienced clinicians, researchers “correctly classified 37 of 
39 malingerers and 20 of 25 psychotics,” achieving an “overall classifi-
cation accuracy of 89.1%.”177  In another test, relying on standard 
neuropsychological tests and batteries, the researchers attained an 
overall correct classification rate of 83%.178  In still another SIMS test, 
reliance on the total score permitted the researchers to accurately 
identify 95.6% of the simulators.179  In a research project employing 
specialized screening instruments for malingering, more than 90% of 
the feigning participants were correctly identified.180  In a study inves-
tigating a malingering index for the MMPI test, “researchers accu-
 174 Schretlen, supra note 160, at 210–11 (“The overall increase in psychometric 
research on response distortion and malingering is shown by the fact that more con-
trolled studies have been reported during the past 15 years than during the preced-
ing 40 years.”). 
 175 Mossman, supra note 46, at 246. 
 176 As Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall noted in their article:  
  The validity of the MMPI has been confirmed by multiple studies.  One 
of the first studies, carried out in 1985 by Fairbanks et al. . . . found that 
using the F scale with cutoffs of 88 allowed investigators to identify ma-
lingering of PTSD more than 90% of the time.  Similar results were re-
ported by McCaffrey and Bellamy-Campbell.  Using the F scale and the 
PTSD subscale, they were able to correctly identify 91% of a population 
consisting of Vietnam veterans with PTSD, Vietnam veterans who were in-
tentional[ly] malingering, and mental health professionals who were also 
Vietnam veterans who were intentionally malingering. 
Hall & Hall, supra note 158, at 719 (internal citations omitted); see Cornell & Hawk, 
supra note 38, at 380. 
 177 Cornell & Hawk, supra note 38, at 380.  But see PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 54, 
at 243. 
 178 Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 227; see PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 54, at 
244–45 (noting that “a number of psychological validity scales, used for detecting 
malingering while embedded in broader measures of personality functioning, have 
met with some qualified success”; the authors mention the MMPI/MMPI-2 scales in 
particular). 
 179 Smith, supra note 66, at 365. 
 180 Id. at 369. 
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rately classified 97% of the authentic profiles and 75% of the malin-
gerers.”181
In a large number of studies, SIRS has demonstrated its validity 
as a method of detecting malingering.182  This specialized instrument 
has been “extensively validated.”183  Importantly, some of the empiri-
cal investigations of SIRS have entailed cross-validation, that is, testing 
the technique’s ability to detect both persons instructed to malinger 
and known malingerers.184  In a 1990 validation study involving an 
early version of SIRS,185 the overall accurate classification rate was 
88%.186  In a 1995 study, researchers accurately identified 96.7% of 
the simulators.187  After the removal of one outlier, the total SIRS 
score enabled researchers to correctly discriminate in 99.4% of the 
sample.188 A 1997 test indicated that when researchers used SIRS in 
conjunction with MMPI-2, they accurately classified 95.5% of the sub-
jects.189
It remains true that an interviewer should not rest a finding of 
malingering on the outcome of any one test,190 even SIRS.191  A thor-
ough,192 multi-method assessment,193 including psychological invento-
ries and specialized malingering instruments, is the soundest ap-
proach.  The techniques can and ought to be used in combination.194  
The interviewer should use SIRS to confirm suspicions of malinger-
ing raised by the other tests.195  Despite the undeniable fallibility of 
 181 Greene, supra note 43, at 190. 
 182 Rogers, supra note 37, at 324. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 327. 
 185 Rogers et al., supra note 56, at 86.  This version involved 150 inquiries.  Id. 
 186 Id. at 89. 
 187 Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 500. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Rogers, supra note 37, at 323. 
 190 Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 228; Smith, supra note 66, at 368;Ogloff, 
supra note 65, at 35. 
 191 Rogers, supra note 37, at 325. 
 192 Rogers, supra note 62, at 396. 
 193 Rogers, supra note 37, at 325.  Hall & Hall explain that: 
It is important to remember that there is no source of data that cannot 
be manipulated or faked by a determined individual. As there is no one 
way to identify the malingering of PTSD, it is critical to examine multi-
ple sources of data and to use sound clinical judgment when determin-
ing if a patient’s symptoms are those of true PTSD or are malingered. 
Hall & Hall, supra note 158, at 723. 
 194 Smith, supra note 66, at 363. 
 195 Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 503. 
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individual detection techniques,196 the objective probability of malin-
gering is high when multiple methods point to that conclusion.197
IV. THE USE OF CURRENTLY AVAILABLE MALINGERING  
DETECTION TECHNIQUES TO IMPROVE THE SUBSTANTIVE ACCURACY OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY ABOUT PRIOR MENTAL STATE 
As Part I noted, the essential question is whether the courts 
should abandon any insistence on a showing of substantive accuracy 
in determining the expert testimony about a subject’s prior mental 
state.  Again, the thesis of this Article is that in a significant number 
of cases it is unnecessary for the courts to do so.  This Part initially de-
scribes the two alternative reasoning processes that an expert can rely 
on in drawing a conclusion as to a subject’s past mental state.  Then 
the Article demonstrates the contribution that malingering testing 
can make to the substantive accuracy of both reasoning processes. 
A. The Two Reasoning Processes an Expert May Logically Rely on in 
Drawing a Conclusion as to a Subject’s Prior Mental State 
As a matter of logic, there are two different routes that an expert 
can take in order to reach a final conclusion as to a subject’s prior 
mental state. 
In one route, the starting point is the subject’s present mental 
state.  Suppose that, at trial, the focus is on the subject’s mental state 
at the time of a prior event—for example, a confrontation one year 
earlier.  The mental condition in question is relatively permanent in 
nature and could easily last one year; and during that year, there are 
no events such as traumatic occurrences or the administration of 
therapy likely to change the subject’s mental state.  Given these cir-
cumstances, if the expert finds that the subject presently has a certain 
mental state, it is a logical inference that the subject had the same 
mental state a year earlier. 
In the second route, the starting point is the subject’s symptoma-
tology at the time of the prior event.  Assume that that set of symp-
toms normally accompanies a certain mental state.  That mental state 
is ordinarily the cause of that constellation of symptoms, or those 
symptoms are common manifestations of the mental state.  If the evi-
dence at trial establishes that the subject displayed those symptoms at 
the time of the event a year earlier, again it is a logical inference that 
the subject had that mental state a year earlier. 
 196 Rogers, supra note 62, at 392. 
 197 Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 503. 
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B. The Contribution that Malingering Testing Can Make to Ensure 
the Substantive Accuracy of the Reasoning Processes 
Whichever reasoning process the expert contemplates relying 
on, the malingering test can play an important role in ensuring the 
substantive accuracy of the expert’s ultimate inference as to the sub-
ject’s prior state of mind. 
Consider the first route, starting with a finding as to the subject’s 
present state of mind.  Part II described various malingering detec-
tion techniques that an expert may employ to detect whether the sub-
ject is presently feigning a state of mind.  As previously stated, it 
would be unsound for the expert to rely on a single test outcome in 
determining whether the subject is malingering.198  However, assume 
that an unstructured interview discloses few, if any, indicators of ma-
lingering and that the subject has no abnormal scores on any of the 
malingering scales for MMPI-2 or SIRS.  The expert would be ration-
ally justified in concluding that the subject is indeed experiencing 
the claimed mental state.   
Moreover, there is data as to the average or probable duration of 
many mental illnesses and states.199  By way of example, that data 
 198 See supra notes 190–97 and accompanying text. 
 199 It is true that some mental conditions are episodic and highly variable over 
time.  However, others tend to be more chronic in nature.  PARRY & DROGIN, supra 
note 54, at 227 (“those mental disorders that would justify a finding of NGRI or di-
minished criminal responsibility are both severe and chronic (e.g. schizophrenia, 
mood disorders, DID, brain injury, and mental retardation) and, thus, may not 
change substantially over time”). 
In the case of major depressive disorder (also known as unipolar disorder), the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual estimates that untreated episodes typically last four 
months or longer.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 167, at 354.  Another authority 
puts the average duration for an untreated patient at six to nine months.  DAVID H. 
BARLOW & MARK DURAND, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 186–87 
(1999).  Further, the typical patient will experience multiple recurrences.  At least 
sixty percent of those diagnosed with a single episode can expect to have a second 
episode.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 167, at 372.  Individuals who have had 
two episodes have a seventy percent chance of a third, and individuals who have ex-
perienced three episodes have a ninety percent chance of having a fourth.  Id. 
Similarly, in the case of bipolar disorder, many persons experience multiple 
mood episodes.  Indeed, five to fifteen percent of the sufferers will have four or more 
episodes in a single year.  Id. at 386. 
In the case of schizophrenia, some signs of the disorder persist for at least six 
months.  Id. at 298.  This is another condition which tends to be chronic in charac-
ter.  BARLOW & DURAND, supra, at 414. 
Likewise, dysthimic disorder has a chronic course.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra 
note 167, at 379.  This disorder cannot be diagnosed until the individual has had 
persistent symptoms for at least two years.  EUGENE H. RUBIN & CHARLES F. ZORUMSKI, 
ADULT PSYCHIATRY 92 (2006).  It can last twenty to thirty years or more.  BARLOW & 
DURAND, supra, at 187. 
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might show that a certain mental condition is relatively permanent in 
nature and is likely to last indefinitely.  If the mental condition is of 
permanent character and there is no evidence of an intervening 
event likely to disrupt the mental condition,200 there is a permissible 
inference that the subject was in the same mental state earlier.  That 
inference is far more than a guess; considered together, the out-
comes of the malingering tests and the research as to the normal du-
ration of the mental illness provide fair assurance that the inference 
is substantively accurate. 
On a previous occasion, Professor Slobogin wrote that “conclu-
sions about present mental state can help the evaluator gauge the va-
lidity of the defendant’s description of his or her past mental state, 
especially if the period between the offense and the evaluation is 
short.”201  Especially in criminal cases, the period may be quite short.  
Suppose, for example, that the subject is an accused criminal, ar-
rested on the very day of the commission of the actus reus.  It is plau-
sible that a psychiatric evaluation of the accused could be conducted 
within a few weeks of the incident.  When the time lapse is that short, 
and multiple malingering techniques point to the conclusion that the 
accused is presently feigning, that is a solid inference that the ac-
cused did not have the claimed mental state at the time of the actus 
reus. 
Now consider the second potential route, starting with the sub-
ject’s symptomatology at the time of the prior event.  Here the under-
lying hypothesis is that there is a connection between those symptoms 
and that mental state.  The research invested in the preparation of 
the diagnostic criteria set out in the latest version of the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders202 investigated that sort of connection.  The research included 
literature reviews, data reanalyses, and field trials.203  More specifi-
cally, there were 150 reviews, the reanalysis of 50 separate data sets, 
Cyclothymic disorder is similarly chronic.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 167, 
at 379. 
 200 Compare the concept of continuity of state of mind used in the application of 
the state-of-mind hearsay exception.  2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 274, at 219–20 
(Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006). 
 201 Christopher Slobogin et al., The Feasibility of a Brief Evaluation of Mental State at 
the Time of the Offense, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 305, 309 (1984). 
 202 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 167. 
 203 Id. at xxvi–xxvii. 
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and field trials at 88 universities and research institutions involving 
more than 7000 subjects.204
In future tests conducted to refine diagnostic criteria to be used 
in forensic cases, more extensive use can be made of malingering de-
tection testing.  In particular, the use of malingering detection tech-
niques can improve the specificity of such criteria:  To what extent 
will these diagnostic criteria yield false positives, that is, the conclu-
sion that a malingerer is suffering from the mental disorder?  By in-
cluding malingering detection testing in the experimental design, re-
searchers can provide a much more reliable answer to that key 
question. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Professor Slobogin’s proposed standard of generally accepted 
content validity will certainly help guarantee that a mental health ex-
pert’s opinion represents something more than that witness’s ipse 
dixit.  I do not want to overstate either the value of malingering de-
tection techniques or my disagreement with Professor Slobogin. 
To begin with, we do not yet have established tests for detecting 
the malingering of every mental state that could be relevant in a legal 
proceeding.  However, there are tests for a number of such mental 
states.  For example, there are techniques for some Axis II disor-
ders205 as well as more serious Axis I disorders.206  Thus, there are 
techniques for detecting malingering of psychoses207 such as schizo-
phrenia208 and affective disorders.209  There are also techniques for 
cognitive impairments210 including mental retardation,211 amnesia,212 
and memory deficits.213  It would probably be fair to say that malin-
gering detection tests currently exist for a significant minority of the 
mental states encountered by psychiatrists and psychologists. 
 204 William D. Wentzel, Review: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
Fourth Edition (DSM-IV), THE ADVOCATE, Aug. 1994, at 25–26. 
 205 Rogers, supra note 37, at 319. 
 206 Id. at 320. 
 207 Schretlen, supra note 160, at 213; Cornell & Hawk, supra note 38, at 377; 
Drogin, supra note 50, at 3. 
 208 Schretlen, supra note 160, at 212, 215; Smith, supra note 66, at 353, 362. 
 209 Smith, supra note 66, at 364; Drogin, supra note 50, at 4. 
 210 PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 54, at 123; Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 
223, 231; Rogers, supra note 62, at 375; Smith, supra note 66, at 352, 364; Drogin, su-
pra note 50, at 713; Mossman, supra note 46; Rubenzer, supra note 48. 
 211 Smith, supra note 66, at 358. 
 212 Smith, supra note 66, at 364; Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 40. 
 213 Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 230; Rogers, supra note 62, at 376; see gen-
erally Iverson et al., supra note 129. 
IMWINKELRIED_FINAL 6/4/2008  7:30:01 PM 
2008] SUBSTANTIVE ACCURACY 1051 
 
Nor do I want to overstate my difference of opinion with Profes-
sor Slobogin.  As Part I noted, in Proving the Unprovable, he makes it 
clear that he is not making a categorical claim that it is never possible 
to test the substantive accuracy of expert testimony about past mental 
state.214  He acknowledges that in a “few instances,” there may be sci-
entifically reliable information about past mental state.215  He specifi-
cally mentions the possibility of using malingering detection tech-
niques.216
My primary concern is that others may cite Proving the Unprovable 
as a basis for a general call to abandon any effort to ensure that the 
expert’s opinion possesses a measure of substantive accuracy.  In a 
significant number of cases, the state of the art of malingering detec-
tion makes it unnecessary to abandon that effort.  Although Professor 
Slobogin’s proposal is a step in the right direction,217 we can do bet-
ter; we can improve the accuracy of mental health experts’ testimony 
by insisting on an appropriate use of malingering detection tech-
niques.  The existing techniques are fallible; but the use of several 
techniques, including the specialized instruments, provides some re-
liable evidence that the expert’s opinion is correct. 
Moreover, I fear that such a general call would be counterpro-
ductive.218  If mental health experts publicly and formally eschew any 
 214 SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 57. 
 215 Id. at 59. 
 216 Id. at 65, 140. 
 217 Andrew E. Taslitz, Book Review: Proving the Unprovable, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2007, at 
70, 76 (noting that “the law is likely to move in the direction [Professor Slobogin] 
suggests over time”). 
 218 My hope is that in the short term, Professor Slobogin’s proposal would be di-
rected primarily to the mental health community itself.  One of the things that I re-
spect the most about Professor Slobogin’s book is its candor.  For example, he points 
out that the proposal is not entirely novel.  A similar proposal was made roughly a 
decade ago by Fishman.  SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 63.  In the decade since, the 
mental health community has evidently done little to implement the proposal.  Pro-
fessor Slobogin explains that there will be major hurdles to overcome in order to 
implement the proposal.  Id. at 67.  To construct the required database, contributing 
clinicians will have to adopt the same terminology and criteria.  Without that, it will 
be impossible to determine whether two cases are “similar enough to make accurate 
comparisons.”  Id. at 67–68.  Further, the database will be useful only if it enables us-
ers to determine that legal decisionmakers found a particular datum or approach 
persuasive.  Unfortunately, legal dispositions are often opaque.  Id. at 68–69.  How 
are we to determine what factors were critical when the disposition is by plea rather 
than trial?  For that matter, at trial how are we to probe behind a general verdict?  I 
think it is fair to say that Professor Slobogin is hopeful that the mental health com-
munity can overcome these hurdles, but he acknowledges that they may prove to be 
insuperable.  Id. at 70. 
The upshot is that this proposal cannot be adopted immediately and perhaps 
may never be able to be implemented.  If the proposal is immediately submitted to 
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attempt at substantive accuracy, the political reaction could be both 
immediate and harsh.  The opponents of legal doctrines such as in-
sanity might well argue that mental health experts have finally con-
ceded what the opponents have long claimed, namely, that there is 
no assurance of the substantive accuracy of the experts’ opinions and 
that in reality, the opinions represent ideology masquerading as ex-
pertise.  Rather than leading to the reform of the relevant legal doc-
trines, the abandonment could well trigger the imposition of Draco-
nian restrictions on the doctrines.  As Mark Twain once remarked, 
“[t]ruth is the most valuable thing we have.”219  We should think long 
and hard before abandoning the pursuit of substantive accuracy. 
 
legal decisionmakers—courts and legislatures—as an alternative to the status quo, 
the most favorable possible reaction would be that the proposal is premature.  Given 
the current political climate on law and order issues, other—decidedly less favor-
able—reactions are distinct possibilities. 
 219 MARK TWAIN, PUDD’NHEAD WILSON’S CALENDAR, quoted in THE POCKET BOOK OF 
QUOTATIONS 409 (1959). 
